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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 42(a), the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to
this Court on March 24, 2014. [R. 738-40.] This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code§ 78A-4-103(2)G).
ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err in holding plaintiff to previously established dead-

lines and denying plaintiffs motion for continuance under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), where
plaintiff presented no explanation, by affidavit or otherwise, why he had failed to pursue
discovery during the 21 months the case had been pending; and where plaintiffs motion
for additional time failed to describe specific proposed discovery or how it would aid
position to summary judgment?
Standard of Review: Utah appellate courts ''apply an abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion and overturn it only if the denial
of the motion exceeds the limits of reasonability." Petersen v. Riverton City, 2010 UT
58,

,r 25,

243 P.3d 1261 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Campbell,

Maack & Sessions v. Deb,y, 2001 UT App 397, iJ 6, 38 P.3d 984.

2.

In the absence of affidavits or other evidence, including expert testimony, to

support plaintiffs claims of legal malpractice and causation, did the district court err in
holding that no evidence suggested defendants' representation fell below the applicable
standard of care, and that plaintiffs alleged damages were caused by his own failure to
even attempt to comply with the divorce court's orders?

Standard of Review: In reviewing a grant of summary judgment:, this Court
reviev,,s the trial comi: s legal conclusions for conectness. Christensen &. Jensen, P. C. v.

Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, ~ 19, 194 P.3d 931. The Cout1 should "determine only

whether the trial comi en-ed in applying the governing iaw and

\1..1 hether

the trial court

correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact.'~ H arline v. Barker, 912
P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a legal malpractice case. Mr. Robinson sued Jones \Valdo, Mr. Clark, and
Ms. Bean (collectively "Jones ,Valdo"), alleging they mishandled their representation of
Ivlr. Robinson in connection with his divorce. [R. 1-14.] In short, Mr. Robinson alleges
that the defendants should have ensured that the settlement of his divorce was contingent
on his ability to refinance a parcel of cmmnercial real estate that was awarded to him in
the settlement.

Mr. Robinson, acting prose, filed his Complaint on October 31, 2011. [R. 1-32.]
He retained counsel some three months later, in February 2012. [R. 724.]
On January 2, 2013, the trial court entered a Stipulated Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order ("Scheduling Order"). [R. 177-80.] The Scheduling Order set a fact discovery deadline of June 28, 20 i3, and required ivfr. Robinson to designate experts by July
26,2013. [R. 178.]
On April 8, 2013, after 13 months of representation, Mr. R.obinson's counsel withdrew. [R. 61-63, 268-69.] Jones \~Valdo immediately filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint
Counsel. [R. 270- 72.]

-2-

From October 2011 to July 2013, Mr. Robinson pursued only minimal discovery,
designated no experts, and failed to file or make any request to extend the discovery or
expert designation deadlines. [See generally R. 207-91, 726.]
On July 28, 2013, after the expiration of discovery and expert disclosure deadlines, Jones Waldo filed a motion for summary judgment. [R. 497-99.] Mr. Robinson
responded with a motion for extension of time to conduct discovery under Rule 56(f), but
did not oppose the facts or arguments presented in support of summary judgment. [R.
504-08.]
On Febmary 12, 2014, the trial court issued a written order denying Mr. Robinson's Rule 56(f) motion and granting Jones Waldo's motion for summary judgment. [R.
724-28.]
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.

The Underlying Divorce Settlement.

In 2007, Mr. Robinson retained Jones Waldo to represent him in a divorce proceeding against his ex-wife, Debra Robinson. [R. 2-3, 195.] During the course of their
marriage, the couple had acquired multiple real estate properties.

The most valuable

property was the "Phoenix Plaza," a strip mall in St. George. [R. 3.] Throughout much
of 2007, Mr. Robinson and Ms. Robinson personally negotiated, without the assistance of
counsel, in an effort to agree upon the division of various real properties in which they
both claimed an interest. [See R. 3, 195.] They eventually agreed to participate in a mediation, which was scheduled for November 2, 2007. [R. 3.]
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Several days prior to the scheduled mediation, Ms. Robinson gave Ivlr. Robinson
an analysis of incorne and occupancy rates of the Phoenix Plaza, as well as her estimate
that the Phoenix Plaza was worth $7.5 million. [R. 4.] She gave this document both to

Mr. Robinson and his Certified Public Accountant. [R. 715.]
On November 1, 2007, the day before the scheduled mediation, lVfs. Robinson's
counsel emailed Ms. Bean a proposed stipulation for discussion at the mediation. [R. 4.]
According to Mr, Robinson, this draft stipulation "generalJy reflected the principles that
the parties agreed on in their discussions leading up to the mediation sessions." [Id.] The
draft stipulation, in relevant part, awarded Mr. Robinson title to the Phoenix Plaza, subject to his obligation to refinance the mortgage on the Plaza in order to pay Ms. Robinson
approximately $1.8 million. [R. 5, 6, 20.] That same day, Ms. Bean sent Ms. Robinson's
proposed stipulation to Mr. Clark to request his comments. [R. 561-62.] Mr. Clark replied:
There probably ought to be some protections in the event [Mr. Robinson] is
unable notwithstanding his "best efforts" to refinance the Phoenix Plaza.
At a minimum there should be a cap on the interest under [Section] 16.B
[of the draft stipulation]. If for some reason he can't refinance within the
next year, he ends up owing her 20% interest, and it just keeps ciimbing?
His incentive to refi is captured at the already-high I 0% rate, so I'm not
sure why he would agree to tack on an additional amount every month~ but
at a minimum there needs to be a cap or some kind of out if for some reason he can't refinance. [R. 562.]
Valuation was l\1r. Robinson's primary concern, and after evaluating infonnation
from Ms. Robinson, his CPA, and several realtors he telephoned during the mediation
[R. 715], and being fully aware that he could take more time to veiify the infonnation
provided by Ms. Robinson, Mr. Robinson (and Ms. Robinson) signed a Stipulation and
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Property Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement") on November 2, 2007. [R. 3031, 684.]
The Settlement Agreement awarded Mr. Robinson title to the Phoenix Plaza, subject to his obligation to refinance the Phoenix Plaza and pay Ms. Robinson approximately
$1.8 million. [R. 20.] The agreement provided that Mr. Robinson "shall file the loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of this Agreement [R. 21-22], and provided
for interest to accrue on the $1.8 million obligation at a flat 8% rate if the refinancing was
not completed within 120 days [R. 21]. In other words, in the weeks leading up to an asyet-unknown nationwide real estate crash, Mr. Robinson agreed to take real estate and to
give Ms. Robinson cash.
On November 5, 2007, the first business day after he signed the Settlement
Agreement, Mr. Robinson called and emailed Ms. Bean to express his desire to ''stop" the
Settlement Agreement from becoming effective, alleging Ms. Robinson had "gross[ly]
overvalue[d]" the Phoenix Plaza. [R. 311, 354, 561.] Even though Mr. Robinson expressed "buyer's remorse," Ms. Bean repeatedly advised Mr. Robinson of the importance
of filing a loan application as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. For example, on
November 29, 2007, Ms. Bean asked Mr. Robinson by email, "[Ms. Robinson] said she
would work with you on getting a good deal on the mortgage-are you two working on
this?" [R. 651.] On December 5, 2007, Ms. Bean told Mr. Robinson, "'[i]t appears that
we need to get moving on [the refinance] immediately .... Have you filed a loan application?" [R. 658.] On December 9, 2007, Ms. Bean advised Mr. Robinson '"our time at
this point is running on your refinancing of the Plaza and I would advise you to move
-5-

forward on doing so.~: [R. 662.] On December l 0, 2007 ~ Jvls. Bean advised Mr. Robinsort, ·'J would encourage you to continue using your best eff01is to refinance:·· [R. 666].
On October 11, 2008, Mr. Clark again advised Ivfr. Robinson to "get an application for

·' re fimancmg
· orr,,me pi1aza on me ana pursue tl as vigorous 1y as you can:·••, rn
C'7£7
me
L1'-. o
I o. 1
r-1

1

•

•

Mr. Robinson "admit[ted] that he and his attorneys/the Defendants discussed the
need to file an application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property," and "both Ms. Bean
and Mr. Clark suggested that Plaintiff should attempt to submit an application." [R. 68586.] Mr. Robinson's emails reveal that he did not submit the application because he was
gambling that interest rates would drop. [R. 594, 651-52.] For example, on November
29, 2007, Mr. Robinson stated: "We are working on it, but rates have been doing a bit of
a roller-coaster. If I can lock a rate slightly below the 6% mark, I will. Making progress;
but I may still need an additional month or two." [R. 651.] Mr. Robinson reasoned that
"most analysts think that rates will drop in December and, again, in January." [R. 652.]
Ms. Bean responded back, "my concern is that rates might just as well go up and then
you would also be in a mess and want to totally redo the deal." [R. 654.]
Notwithstanding the advice of Iv1s. Bean and the express requirement of ihe Settlement Agreement that he do so, Mr. Robinson never filed a refinance application within
the fifteen days after signing the Settlement Agreement or at any time since. [See R. 369,
686.] On February 22, 2008, 1\1s. Robinson provided Mr. Robinson with the financial
report that ~1r. Robinson claimed was necessary to submit an application. [R. 412, 716.]
Mr. Robinson, however, still did not submit an application to refinance.
369.]
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[See R. 312,

'"':===::::""'

.... ·-----

On February 7, 2008, Ms. Robinson filed a motion in the underlying divorce case
to enter a decree consistent with the Settlement Agreement. [R. 7-8, 312, 357-58.] In her
motion, Ms. Robinson argued that Mr. Robinson had "no excuses for failing to fill out a
loan application because he actually needed no financial statements or other accounting
infonnation until ... after the application was submitted [and Mr. Robinson] has his own
direct access to that infonnation." [R. 8.] In partial response to Ms. Robinson's motion,
and in view of Mr. Robinson's request that Jones Waldo attempt to undo the Settlement
Agreement, Jones Waldo filed a motion to set aside the Settlement Agreement. [R. 312,
360-63.]
Ms. Bean and Mr. Clark, however, explained in emails to Mr. Robinson the low
probability of setting aside the Settlement Agreement he had voluntarily signed:
We can only get this agreement set aside if we prove that Debra [Ms. Robinson] committed active fraud or conceahnent--part of the difficulty is that
you had access to all the deposits and anything else that you wanted to review and you also had the same access to the CPA and your realtor for input. . . . [U]nless we can prove fraud or concealment, we don't have a
strong basis for setting aside the deal otherwise and their position will be
that you simply want a new deal. [R. 662; see also R. 676.]
On November 17, 2008, the divorce court denied the motion to set aside the Settlement Agreement, entered an order enforcing its terms, and entered a divorce decree
that incorporated those tenns. [R. 365-70, 376-89.] The court found that "Mr. Robinson
did not do what he specifically agreed to do [in the Settlement Agreement] to initiate the
refinance process. None of us will ever know given that, whether had he done so, the refinance would or would not have occurred." [R. 369.]
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Mr. Robinson terminated Jones Vvaldo~s represen1ation shortly after the November

175 2008~ ruling and retained nevi' counsel to appeal the ruling. [R. 10-1 l.J The Utah
Court of Appeals affim1ed the decision of the divorce comi and "note[ d] that Husband~s

ability to provide evidence that performance was impossible or highly impracticable is
severely limited where he never actually applied for a loan as contemplated, let alone
having done so in the time frame set forth by the [Settlement Agreement]." [R. 400; Ro-·

binson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App. 96,

~

12, n.4, 232 P.3d 1081.] 1v[r. Robinson's peti-

tion for writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court was denied. [R. 11.]
Notvvithstanding the exhaustion of his appeals, Mr. Robinson still failed to comply
with the Settlement Agreement. The trial court in the divorce proceeding eventually entered a $2.3 million judgment against him. [R. 11, 314.]

B.

The Malpractice Action.

Mr. Robinson sued Jones \J\TaJdo for malpractice on October 31, 2011, generally
alleging that Mr. Clark and Ms. Bean failed to adequately advise and represent him in
connection with the November 2, 2007 mediation. [See R. 4-7.] From the time he filed
his Complaint on October 31, 2011, through the date of the court-ordered discovery deadline of June 28, 2013, Mr. Robinson conducted almost no discovery. He made no effort
to take any depositions, and he did not appear at the deposition of lv[s. Robinson. 1 He did

1

l\1r. Robinson's assertion that he convinced his divorce counsel to attend Ms. Robinson~ s deposition is incoITect. [R. 554.] No one appeared at !v1s. Robinson's deposition
on Ivlr. Robinson's behalf. Unfmiunately (but inconsequentially), the trial court record
does not reflect this.
..g ..

not designate any experts by the appointed deadline, and he failed to file or make any request to extend the discovery or expert deadlines. [See R. 514-15, 730-32.]
On July 29, 2013, after the discovery and expert disclosure deadlines expired,
Jones Waldo filed its motion for summary judgment. [R. 497-99.] Jones Waldo argued
that summary judgment was appropriate for two reasons: First, Mr. Robinson had failed
to designate an expert to opine that Jones Waldo's conduct fell below the applicable standard of care. Second, Jones Waldo argued that Mr. Robinson could not provide any evidence that the alleged malpractice caused his alleged damages, because ( 1) Ms. Robinson
would never have agreed to the provision Mr. Robinson now claims Jones Waldo should
have put in the Settlement Agreement; (2) Mr. Robinson's own actions-specifically, his
failure to attempt to refinance the Phoenix Plaza-were the cause of the divorce judgment against him; (3) there was no evidence that Mr. Robinson would have obtained a
better outcome absent the alleged malpractice; and (4) collateral estoppel barred Mr. Robinson's loss-causation theory. [R. 318-30.] Jones Waldo served the motion to Mr. Robinson at his address of record. [R. 268, 331, 499.]

Mr. Robinson did not request any extension of time from Jones Waldo to oppose
the motion for smmnary judgment. 2 Instead, he filed a Rule 56(f) Motion for Extension

2

Mr. Robinson argues that Jones Waldo's counsel ignored his _request for an extension of
time to respond to the motion for summary judgment, and in doing so likely violated the
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. [See, e.g., App. Bf. 11-12, 51; R. 547, 549,
703.] That is incorrect. Counsel for Jones Waldo received two infonnational emails
from Mr. Robinson's counsel, Mr. Kimball. Mr. Kimball's first email stated that "I will
be filing a request for extension of time to respond to your motion today. If you would
like to discuss this matter today, please feel free to contact me." [R. 567 (emphasis added).] Mr. Kimball's second email stated that "[i]t may be that I will ask for more time ...
-9-

of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment. In that motion and in subsequent briefs in
support of his motion, Mr. Robinson made no attempt to dispute or set f01ih a separate
statement of additional facts to controvert any of the facts presented in Jones Waldo's
-r
t"d 11
n
b'
monon ror summary Juagrnent. l'-'Or
a1 . NH. 1\.0 mson present any argmnent to oppose
, •

,..

•

1

.._

,r

Jones Waldo~s arguments in favor of summary judgment. Instead, in :Mr. Robinson~s
opening brief, he asse1ied that he was unaware Jones Waldo had filed a motion for sum-

mary judgment, and argued that he needed additional time for discovery because he had
been unable to retain new counsel for months. [See R. 502-1 O.] In his reply memorandum, Mr. Robinson asserted that his new counsel would like to depose Ms. Bean and Mr.
Clark, that he had retained an expert-albeit providing no infonnation on the experf s qualifications, anticipated testimony, or anticipated timing of a report-and that he could
not previously depose Ms. Bean because of his difficulty in acquiring counsel. [See R.
546-56.]
On February 12, 2014, the district court issued a written ruling denying Mr. Robinson's Rule 56(f) motion and granting Jones Waldo's motion for summary judgment.
In denying Mr. Robinson's Rule 56(f) motion, the trial court ruled that (1) rvfr. Robinson
vv1as '"required to follow the discovery plan and designate expert witnesses by July 26,

given the several hundred pages you have filed and my still nascent familiarity with the
facts. But it is too soon to do more than briefly speculate on that supposition. Please advise." [R. 569 (emphasis added).] These emails were informational. They did not request an extension of time. !vforeover, this argument is a red heITing. If Mr. Kimball believed Jones Waldo's counsel to be uncooperative or unresponsive, he could have moved
the trial court for an extension of time to respond to the smmnary judgment. He did not

do so.
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2013"; (2) Mr. Robinson's "original counsel withdrew in April and he had over three
months to retain new counsel and either comply with the discovery plan and scheduling
order to seek to amend the plan"; (3) Mr. Robinson "missed the deadline to designate any
expert witnesses; he has missed all subsequent deadlines and cut off dates"; and (4) Mr.
Robinson "did not present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of diligence in completing
discovery." [R. 726.]
Having denied the motion for continuance, the court turned to the merits of Jones
Waldo's motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, on the basis that
(1) Mr. Robinson "has not filed any affidavits or other evidence which raise an issue of
disputed material fact to survive a motion for summary judgment"; (2) without an expert
witness, Mr. Robinson "cannot demonstrate that the defendants' representation of him in
his divorce action fell below the applicable standard of care"; and (3) "the affidavits,
emails, and other evidence presented by defendants in support of their motion demonstrate that plaintiff cannot show that any alleged breach by defendants caused any loss to
him." [R. 726-27.] Specifically, the trial court stated,
Based upon his failure to even attempt to comply with the Stipulation [i.e.,
his settlement agreement with Debra Robinson], this Court and other courts
have ruled against [Mr. Robinson] in other cases. [Mr. Robinson] cannot
show that any actions by defendants have caused the financial losses he is
facing. As other courts have held, his failure to even attempt to comply
with the Stipulation ha[ s] been the cause of his losses.
[R. 727.]

-11-

SUIVIMARY OF ARGUIV!ENT
The trial court's deniaj of Mr. Robinson~s Rule 56(f) motion \;\Jas not an abuse of

discretion. Mr. Robinson never explained hO\:v further discovery would uncover disputed
facts for opposing summary judgment. He never described a viable theory for opposing
summary judgment even if his request for more discovery had been allowed. Mr. Robinson was also dilatory. After nearly two years of litigation, during most of which Mr.
Robinson was represented by counsel, and for several months after his counsel withdrew,
Mr. Robinson made almost no effort to pursue the case. He had no good explanation for
this prolonged passivity. In contrast, Jones Waldo relied on the trial comi' s Scheduling
Order, honored the applicable discovery deadlines and diligently pursued discovery. Accordingly, the trial comi's conclusion that Mr. Robinson "did not present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of diligence" [R. 726] was correct, and its denial of Mr. Robinson: s
Rule 56(f) motion should be affinned.
The trial court also c01Tectly granted Jones Waldo's smrunary judgment motion.
Mr. Robinson had made no effort to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Given
the lack of any opposition, the trial court properly accepted Jones ~/aldo's proffered facts
as true. The record also suppmis the trial court's conclusion that an expe1i witness was
necessary to establish the standard of care and breach.

Whether Jones Waldo should

have counselled Mr. Robinson against accepting a divorce settiement in which he received property and. agreed to refinance it in order to buy his wife out of her equity is not

per se unreasonable--it happens every day. \Vhether something about this transaction or
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the complexity of this case made it different is certainly not within the ordinary experience of lay jurors, so expert testimony was needed.
Finally, even assuming Ms. Robinson would have agreed to a different deal-a
proposition she expressly rejected in her deposition [R. 316-17, 421-24]-the outcome is
completely speculative because Mr. Robinson never applied for the financing and because the record provides no evidence of what a different outcome might have looked
like. Rather than apply for refinancing, Mr. Robinson chose to gamble on interest rates.
The lower court acted correctly in accepting the divorce court's conclusion that Mr. Robinson's "failure to even attempt to comply with the stipulation [has] been the cause of his
losses."
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DENIAL OF MR. ROBINSON'S RULE 56(f)
MOTION WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The trial court denied Mr. Robinson's Rule 56(£) motion because (1) Mr. Robinson was "required to follow the discovery plan and designate expert witnesses by July 26,
2013"; (2) Mr. Robinson's "original counsel withdrew in April and he had over three
months to retain new counsel and either comply with the discovery plan and scheduling
order to seek to amend the plan"; (3) Mr. Robinson "missed the deadline to designate any
expert witnesses; he has missed all subsequent deadlines and cut off dates"; and (4) Mr.
Robinson "did not present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of diligence in completing
discovery." [R. 726.]

-13-

Aecording to the Utah Supreme Court, "[ w]e review the denial of a rule 56([) motion for an abuse of discretion ..,~ Overstock.com, Inc. v. S,nartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT
55, ~ 20, 192 P.3d 858. ''V\1e will not reverse the district court's decision to grant or deny
a rule 56(f) motion for discovery unless it 'exceeds the limits of rcasonability. m

Jc!.

(quoting Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1242-43 (Utah 1994)).
Some of the relevant factors in determining whether a rule 56(f) motion is
warranted include ... (1) an examination of the party~s rule 56(f) affidavit
to determine whether the discovery sought will uncover disputed material
facts that will prnvent the grant of summary judgment or if the party requesting discovery is simply on a "fishing expedition," (2) whether the party opposing the summary judgment motion has had adequate time to conduct discovery and has been conscientious in pursuing such discovery, and
(3) the diligence of the party moving for summary judgment in responding
to the discovery requests provided by the party opposing summary judgment.

Overstock,

'if 21; see also Crossland, 877 P.2d at 1243 ("the trial court need not grant rule

56(f) motions that are dilatory or lacking in merit"); Jensen v. S1nith, 2007 UT App 152,

1j 2, 163 P .3d 657 ("a court should not grant a rnle 56(f) motion to protect a paiiy from its
own lack of diligence or from the merits of the motion for smmnary judgment").
Here, all three Overstock factors strongly favor denying Mr. Robinson's Rule
56(f) motion, and the trial court did not exceed the "limits of reasonability" in so doing.

A.

Mr. Robinson has never explained how further
discovery would uncover disputed material facts
for opposing summary judgment.

As to the first Overstock factor, the Utah Supreme Court has required that the Rule
56(f) affidavit do more than merely recite the conclusion that additional discovery will
help a party resist summary judgment
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Simply asserting that more discovery is needed and that a proper response
to the motion for summary judgment is impossible due to the other party's
failure to cooperate with discovery requests is inadequate to overcome
summary judgment. . . . Parties must offer more than conclusory assertions
to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial, and cannot justify
further discovery without providing a viable theory as to the nature of the
facts they wish to obtain.

Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, 157, 70 P.3d 1 (quotation marks and
tions omitted); see also Riddle v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 2004 UT App 487,

1 17,

105

P.3d 970 ("[T]he trial court properly refused to allow [plaintiffJ to conduct further discovery because [plaintiffJ failed to explain in his affidavit how additional discovery
would aid in his opposition to summary judgment.").
Here, Mr. Robinson sought to depose Ms. Bean and Mr. Clark. Mr. Robinson
failed, however, to meet his burden to show how this proposed discovery would uncover
disputed material facts to aid in opposing summary judgment. The only explanation by
way of affidavit3 was contained in Mr. Robinson's supplemental affidavit offered in connection with his reply memorandum in support of the motion for additional time:
If I can depose Bean I can ask her to explain the attached emails, and I anticipate her responses will give me the information to better oppose a summary judgment motion. I also want to ask Clark if he feels that Bean adequately followed his advice to protect my interests. I don't lmow exactly
how long this would take .... [R. 554.]

3

In his "Sur Sur Response Memorandum" he also stated he desired to depose Mr. Clark
and Ms. Bean to ask them questions such as "why mediation was attempted without having accurate financial infonnation and valuation information regarding the marital properties in advance of the mediation" and "why was the settlement document not revised to
contain appropriate representations and warranties with safeguards concerning leases and
property values?" [R. 704.]
-15-

lvfr. Robinson never explained what infonnation he expected to obtain from lvis.
Bean, or how it might defeat a summary judgment motion that was based on failure to
identify an expert witness on the applicable standard of care. The same is true of Mr.
Clark's "feelings" about the sitLiation, and in any event his feelings are irTelevant. This
did not present a legitimate theory to oppose the motion for summary judgment. See Cal-

lioux v. Progressive Ins. Co, 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("[A] conclusory
assertion that the scheduled depositions were expected to produce matter essential to
olution of defendant's motion smacks of a fishing expedition for purely speculative
facts."); Hobnes v. Anierican States Ins. Co., 2000 UT App 85,

if 27,

1 P.3d 552 (affirm-

ing denial of a Rule 56(f) motion where additional discovery sought would not be relevant to the legal issues presented in smmnary judgment).

B.

4

The trial court properly found l\1r. Robinson did
not present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of
diligence.

As to the second Overstock factor, the trial comi found that Mr. Robinson "did not
present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of diligence in completing discovery." [R.
726.] That conclusion was based on specific findings regarding lvfr. Robinson's various
delays in prosecuting the entire case. In view of the totality of these facts and circumstances, the trial court concluded that Mr. Robinson "did not present a sufficient basis to

4

See also Jones ex rel Jones v. Bountifit! City Corp., 834 P .2d 556, 561-62 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (affinning the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion because additional discovery on
issues sought were i1Televant); American Towers OViiliers Ass 'n Inc. v. CCI Mechanical,
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1996) (affim1ing the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion because, even if facts as believed were discovered, it would have been irrelevant).
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excuse his lack of diligence in completing discovery." [Id.] This was not an abuse of
discretion.
Mr. Robinson's failure to comply with the expert disclosure deadline reflected a
similar lack of diligence. Mr. Robinson stated for the first time in his Rule 56(f) reply
brief that "Plaintiff has retained an expert, Orson West Esq., and assumes Defendants
would like to depose him as well." [R. 548; see also R. 550, 564 (providing no further
information on Mr. West).] Beyond this brief reference, Mr. Robinson has failed to reveal anything else about his expert, leaving the trial court and Jones Waldo to speculate
about what type of witness he was, what topics he might have addressed, and what he
might have said about them. This vague, passing reference to an expert provided the trial
court no information on how the proposed expert might affect summary judgment.
Ignoring his lack of diligence, Mr. Robinson asserts that trial court's denial of his
Rule 56(f) motion was "clearly based on the length of time that it took Robinson to retain
new counsel." [App. Bf. 47.] He contends that any failure on his part to diligently pursue discovery or amend the discovery deadlines arose because "he was intimidated by the
process and felt his time was better served by seeking counsel."

[R. 550.]

Those

excuses, however, do not explain his lack of diligence in pursuing discovery for the 13
months when he was represented by counsel.
In Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, 232 P.3d 1059, Ms. Gudmundson
changed counsel nearly two years after the commencement of the suit. The new counsel
appeared eight days before the close of fact discovery. The defendants filed summary
judgment motions after the discovery deadline. Ms. Gudmundson sought leave under
-17-

Rule 56([) to conduct additional discovery, arguing that she had just obtained new counsel~ and the discovery would reveal evidence relevant to her claims. The district comi
denied her Rule 56(f) motion and granted defendants~ summary judgment motions. The
Utah Supreme Court affirmed:

Although Ms. Gudmundson's current counsel entered an appearance only
eight days before the close of fact discovery, Ms. Gudmundson has not sufficiently demonstrated that her fonner counsel was incompetent or otherwise unable to diligently perform the needed discovery. She has not shown
why her former counsel could not perform the needed discovery ....
Although rnle 56(f) motions are to be granted liberally, in this case,
lVIs. Gudmundson's failure to adequately explain the lack of diligence does
not convince us that the district court exceeded the limits of reasonability
when it denied the motion.

Id. ~122-23 (emphasis in original).
Similarly here, lvfr. Robinson focuses on the three months between the withdrawal
of his counsel and new counsel's entry of appearance, but he ignores his inactivity during
the preceding 17 months. For 13 of those months, he was represented by counsel. It was
the failure to pursue the case during the entire 21 months from filing, not just the final
three months, that the trial comi found to evidence a lack of diligence. It was well within
its discretion. See Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, ,I 27, 265 P.3d 139 (affinning
trial courf s conclusion that Ms. Dahl "had been dilatory and that her request for an ex-tensjon of the fact discovery deadline was not founded in fact or in reason.~').
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C.

Mr. Robinson has not alleged that Jones Waldo
failed to respond diligently to discoven'.

As to the third Overstock factor, Mr. Robinson has not argued that his alleged need
for additional discovery was caused by delays attributable to Jones Waldo. Accordingly,
this factor weighs in favor of affinnance as well.

D.

The trial court properly considered Mr. Robinson's
pro se status.

Mr. Robinson's arguments rest in large part on his claim that the trial court exceeded "the limits of reasonableness" because it failed to give him special treatment as a

pro se litigant. That contention is without merit.

Mr. Robinson's argument ignores the fact that he was represented for thirteen
months, but still did not diligently pursue the case. Moreover, under Utah law, "although
a pro se litigant should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be indulged,
we will ultimately hold him to the same standard of lmowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar." Midland Funding, LLC v. Pipkin, 2012 UT App 185,

if 2, 283

P.3d 541 (quotation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has warned that "reasonable
dulgence is not unlimited indulgence." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56,

,r 11, 194 P.3d 903.

In recognition of this principle, the trial court held that "[w ]bile pro se litigants should be
accorded every consideration that may reasonabl[y] be indulged, they are bound to follow
the rules of civil procedure just as counsel are."
If these pronouncements are to mean anything, they must permit the trial court to
enforce scheduling orders and other deadlines against pro se litigants. Here, the trial
court did not exceed "the limits of reasonableness" by expecting Mr. Robinson either to
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comply with the djscovery plan or to seek to amend the plan. Nor did it exceed "'the lin1-its of reasonableness'~ by concluding that Mr. Robinson should not have missed the couri•·
ordered deadlines.

E.

IVir. Robinson ~s :request for relief under Rule 6(b)
or Rule 37 has been waived and is contrary to
established law.

For the first time on appeal, Mr. Robinson contends that his Rule 56(f) motion
"could actually be considered" under Rule 6(b) or perhaps Rule 37. [See App. Bf. 4748.] Those arguments were not made below and have been waived. See 438 Main Street

v. Easy .Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72,

,r 51,

99 P .3d 80 I ("to preserve an issue for appeal, the

issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on the issue. . . .

Issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed

waived.").
Notwithstanding this waiver, under Rule 6(b ), "'the com1 may, for good cause, extend the time ... on a motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.'~

Under Utah law, however, "excusable neglect requires

some evidence of diligence in order to justify relief." Jones v. Layton/Ok/and, 2009 UT
39, ~ 20,214 P.3d 859 (applying "excusable neglect" standard of Rule 60(b)). In light of
the district court's findings of lack of diligence, Iv1r. Robinson's Rule 6(b) argument
would therefore be unavailing even if it had not been waived.
The newly raised Rule 37 argument also lacks merit. Mr. Robinson contends that
the trial comi abused its discretion by exceeding its broad discretionary "sanction'~
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ers under Rule 37 when it denied Mr. Robinson an extension to designate an expert witness-in effect excluding his expert.
First, Mr. Robinson's Rule 37 argument is factually incorrect. Mr. Robinson asserts that on August 16, 2014, he moved the trial court for "two extensions," one for time
to conduct discovery and another to allow the late designation of an expert witness.
[App. Bf. 47.] This misstates the record. Mr. Robinson's August 16, 2014 motion only
moved for additional time to conduct discovery with no mention of any expert witness.
[See R. 500-10.] Mr. Robinson only mentioned an expert, for the first time, in his Rule

56(f) motion reply brief by vaguely stating "Plaintiff has retained an expert, Orson West
Esq., and assumes Defendants would like to depose him as well." [R. 548, 550, 564.]

There was never a request for an extension of the deadline to designate experts. Nor did
the court apply Rule 37 sanctions to exclude any expert. Rather, the motion only focused
on the need for further discovery under Rule 56(f). The trial comi properly ruled on the
motion in view of the standards for Rule 56(f).
Second, Mr. Robinson's Rule 37 argument is incorrect as a matter of law. In Callister v. Snowbird Corp., 2014 UT App 243, the Court recently held that a "denial of a

motion to extend deadlines is not a sanction under rule 37 .... " Id.

il 32.

This Court re-

fused to apply Rule 3 7 standards, applied the normal "abuse of discretion" standard,
finned the trial court's refusal to extend the deadline to designate experts, and affinned
the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on failure to timely designate an expert. Id.

,r,r 15, 21, 30-34.
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IL

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED JONES
WALDO'S MOTION FOR SUMl\1ARY JUDGMENT

In order to sustain a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must plead and prove
"(i) an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from

their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach
of duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (v) actual damages." 1-Iarline v. Barker~
912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). Jones \Valdo moved for sumrnary judgment on the elements of breach and causation. At the trial court level, Mr. Robinson did not oppose
Jones Waldo's motion for summary judgment. Rather, Mr. Robinson only moved the tri-

al court for more time to conduct discovery under Rule 56(f). As explained above, the
trial court properly denied that Rule 56(f) motion.
What remained was Jones Waldo's unopposed motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted the motion because (1) "[w ]ithout an expert witness, [Mr. Robin-

son] cannot demonstrate that the defendants' representation of him in his divorce action
fell below the applicable standard of care"; (2) "the affidavits, emails, and other evidence
presented by defendants in support of their motion demonstrate that plaintiff cannot show
that any alleged breach by defendants caused any loss to him"; and (3) "[a]s other courts
have held, his failure to even attempt to comply with the [Settlement Agreement] ha[s]
been the cause of his losses." [R. 726-27.]
Now, for the first time on appeal, Mr. Robinson:, argues that: (1.) the trial comi has
an independent obligation to fen-et out from the record whether issues of fact exist before
granting summary judgment; (2) there is no need for an expert to prove breach of the duty
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of care; and (3) there are issues of fact associated with causation. Those arguments were
not presented to the trial comi. As such, they are waived. Stevens v. Wall, 2011 UT App
372,

ilil 3-4, 264 P.3d 568 (holding that appellant's failure to oppose the summary judg-

ment motion in the trial court results in a waiver of the challenge to the smrunary judgment on appeal); see also Olsen v. Park-Craig-Olsen, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) (declining to consider arguments that were not raised at the trial court in
the opposition to summary judgment). "Merely mentioning an issue does not preserve it;
the issue must be specifically raised, with relevant legal authority, in a manner that alerts
the court to the need to correct the error." Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97,

iJ 38,

302

P.3d 1220.

A.

The trial court has no obligation to ferret out facts
and make arguments for Mr. Robinson.

Having failed to oppose the summary judgment motion, Mr. Robinson contends
that "courts must examine the entire record submitted to detennine whether there are any
issues of fact." [App. Bf. 40.] The Utah Court of Appeals, however, has specifically rejected Mr. Robinson's assertion. An "assertion that a trial court has an independent duty
to ferret out opposing facts in prior pleadings in the record when a party fails to respond
to a summary judgment motion is contrary to the rules." See In re Estate of Kuhn, 2008
UT App 400, at 3, 2008 WL 4748195, *2 (unpublished).
Under Rule 7(c)(3)(A), a memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment "shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends
no genuine issue exists. . . . Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted. by the res-ponding party."

Rule 7( c)(l) states that "a paiiy opposing the motion shall file a

randum in opposition [within 14 days.]'~ And under Rule 56(e), if the summary judgment
motion is properly supported, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the pleadings, but the response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against a party failing to file such a response."
In Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debly, 2001 UT App 397, 38 P.3d 984,
tiff law finn CMS sued defendant Ms. Debry for failure to pay for ClvfS's representation
of Ms. Debry in a divorce action. Ms. Debry counterclaimed for malpractice. At the
close of discovery, CivfS filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the
counterclaim. Ms. Debry did not file an opposition to the summary judgment motion,
instead filing a Rule 56(t) motion for additional time. The trial court denied the Rule
56(f) motion and granted CMS 's motion for sununary judgment. Id.

,r,r 4-5.

[W]hen a party ... fails to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court may properly conclude
that there are no genuine issues of fact unless the face of the movant's affidavit affinnatively discloses the existence of such an issue.
Here, in the face of CMS' s motion for sununary judgment, Debry
failed to submit either an affidavit or any other acceptable evidentiary materials to rebut the motion. Accordingly, the trial court properly assumed that
no genuine issues of materiai fact existed and correctly proceeded to determine whether CMS was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

At a minimum, CMS presented a prima facie case that Debry had
suffered no damage as a result of its representation. Accordingly, for De-
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b1y's claims to survive CMS's motion, the trial court properly required Debry to provide some evidence in support of the essential elements of her
claim. In failing to submit either an affidavit or any other evidentiary materials, Debry effectively conceded that no genuine issues of material fact existed and accepted the facts presented by CMS. Therefore, the trial court
properly concluded that Debry had suffered no damages as a result of
CMS' s representation.

Id.

,r,r 16-17, 20 (citations and footnotes omitted).
In the present case, the trial court explicitly found Jones Waldo's summary judg-

ment motion was properly supported, so Mr. Robinson could not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Jones Waldo presented a prima facie case that Mr. Robinson could not prove breach of the standard of care and causation of damages. The
court appropriately expected Mr. Robinson to set forth specific facts showing that there
were genuine issues for trial. He did not. As was proper under Rule 7(c)(3)(A), the trial
court deemed the facts set forth in Jones Waldo's summary judgment admitted. And, in
view of those facts, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Jones Waldo.

B.

Mr. Robinson's new arguments regarding breach
of the applicable standard of care lack merit.

The Utah Court of Appeals has held that "expert testimony may be necessary to
'establish [ ] the standard of care required in cases dealing with duties owed by a particular profession,' especially 'where the average person has little understanding of the duties
owed' by the particular profession at issue, or the 'case [] involv[es] complex ... allegations'." Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency Inc., 2009 UT App 347,

,r 21, 222 P.3d 775

(citing Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260,263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). In
its recent Snowbird case, this Court applied this standard to hold that expert testimony
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was required to establish whether a ski resort operator had a duty to dig out snow or provi de warning ropes to prevent a lovv-traveling ski tram from striking a skier on the
ground. See 2014 UT App 243,

'ilif 10~

15, 20-21. The Court reasoned that expert testi-

mony is required if the standard of care involves "jssues that do not fall \Vhhin the
mon knowledge and experience of lay jurors," and the average person would not have
knowledge of how a reasonable ski operator would act. Id.

,r,r 19-20.

If an expert is required to show that a reasonable ski operator would rope off areas
where a tram might collide with a standing skier, then an expert is certainly required to
establish how a reasonable ]awyer might handle a complex divorce settlement. In viev,,
of the complexity of this case and applicable law, the trial court properly recognized, and

l\1r. Robinson never disputed, that jurors would require expe1i testimony to aid them in
understanding the applicable standard of care and breach of that standard. [See R. 726.].
For this reason, the trial comi's grant of sununary judgment should be affin11ed. See Jen-

sen v. Smith, 2007 UT App 152,

i1 6,

163 P Jd 657 ("Plaintiff's argument that expert

timony was not required to prove his claim of medical malpractice was not raised before
the trial court. Vve therefore need not discuss this argument.").
In support of his proposition that no expe1i is required to establish breach in this
case, Mr. Robinson cites George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 600 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1979), and Nixond01fv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348,352 (Utah 1980). Those cases, however, are inapplicable to this case.
In George, the New Mexico Comi of Appeals naITo-wly held that ''[i]t does not require expert testimony to establish the negligence of an attorney who is ignorant of the
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applicable statute of limitations." 600 P.2d at 829. Here, the issues do not pertain to a
statute of limitations or any other bright-line rule that implicates the absolute success or
failure of a claim as in George.
In Nixondo,f, the Utah Supreme Court held:
In the majority of medical malpractice cases the plaintiff must introduce
expert testimony to establish this standard of care. Expert testimony is required because the nature of the profession removes the particularities of its
practice from the knowledge and understanding of the average citizen.
However, this Court has recognized certain exceptions to the general rule
requiring expert testimony... . The loss of a surgical instrument or other
paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment.
612 P.2d at 352. Here, this is not a medical malpractice case where a doctor lost a surgical instrument in a patient-an act so obviously wrong that courts have recognized it as
an exception to the requirement of expert testimony to establish the standard of care. Rather, it is undisputed that this case involves complex allegations, where "[e]xpert testimony is required because the nature of the profession removes the particularities of its practice from the knowledge and understanding of the average citizen." Id.
Finally, Mr. Robinson claims for the first time on appeal that Mr. Clark established the standard of care in the portion of his email that said, "[t]here probably ought to
be some protections in the event [Mr. Robinson] is unable notwithstanding his 'best efforts' to refinance the Phoenix Plaza" [R. 562.], and "[a]t a minimum there should be a
cap on the interest .... " [R. 562.] But the email was simply advice given-it says nothing about the applicable standard of care. "An attorney is required to possess the legal
knowledge and skills c01mnon to members of his profession, and to represent his client's
interest with competence and diligence. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah
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J. 982) (citations omitted). Vv'hether Iv1r.

Clark's email describes the prevailing standard of

care or a higher standard requires expert testimony. lv1ore to the point, the question in
this case is not whether the email met the standard of care, but whether the advice given

in connection with the ultimate settlement of the case--in vvhich Mr. Robinson agreed to
finance the property to cash his ex-wife out of it, and the escalating penalty interest Mr.
Clark was wo1Tied about was replaced with a capped 8% interest rate-was consistent
with the prevailing standard in similar cases. That standard is not within the common

lmowledge of lay jurors, so expert testimony was required.

C.

l\1r. Robinson's new arguments regardin!!
causation and damages lack merit.

"In a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must plead and prove ... a causal connection between the breach of duty and the resulting injury to the client." H arline, 912
P.2d at 439.
In Utah, causation or the connection between fault and damages in legal
malpractice actions cannot properly be based on speculation or conjecture.
To prevail in legal malpractice actions, clients must establish actual
cause--that but for the attorney's wrong their loss would not have occurred-and proximate cause-that a reasonable likelihood exists that they
would have ultimately benefited.

Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation

omitted). As the trial comi properly found, Mr. Robinson failed to demonstrate that "any
alleged breach by defendants caused any loss to him." And further, Mr. Robinson's ~'failure to even attempt to comply with the [Settlement Agreement has] been the cause of his
losses.'~ [R. 726-27.]
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1.

Mr. Robinson ignored the counsel of Ms.
Bean when he chose not to refinance.

Mr. Robinson asserts, without any citation to support his claims, that Jones Waldo
instructed him "that he did not need to ·make a loan application within the 15 day time
period" because Ms. Robinson had been the first to breach. [App. Bf. 45.] Mr. Robinson
contends that, but for this instruction, he would have refinanced. And he contends that he
sustained damages as a result of the failure to refinance. But the record contains no evidence to support such conjectures.
Jones Waldo repeatedly and ardently advised Mr. Robinson to submit a refinance
application. On November 29, 2007, Ms. Bean asked Mr. Robinson by email, "[Ms. Robinson] said she would work with you on getting a good deal on the mortgage--are you
two working on this?" [R. 651.] On December 5, 2007, Ms. Bean told Mr. Robinson,
"[i]t appears that we need to get moving on [the refinance] immediately . . . . Have you
filed a loan application?" [R. 658.] On December 9, 2007, Ms. Bean advised Mr. Robinson "our time at this point is running on your refinancing of the Plaza and I would advise
you to move f01ward on doing so." [R. 662.] On December 10, 2007, Ms. Bean advised
Mr. Robinson, "I would encourage you to continue using your best efforts to refinance."

[R. 666]. On October 11, 2008, Mr. Clark again advised Mr. Robinson to "get an application for the refinancing of the Plaza on file and pursue it as vigorously as you can[.]"
[R. 676.] Even Mr. Robinson "admit[ted] that he and his attorneys/the Defendants discussed the need to file an application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property," and "both
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jvfs. Bean and Jvlr. Clark suggested that Plaintiff should attempt to submit an application.::
[R. 685-86.]
Mr. Robinson's emails reveal that he did not submit the application because he
was gambling that interest rates would drop. [R. 594, 651-52.] On November 29, 2007 ~

Mr. Robinson, in responding to Ms. Bean's inquiry on the progress of the refinancing application, stated: "We are working on it, but rates have been doing a bit of a rollercoaster. If I can lock a rate slightly below the 6% mark, I will. Making progress, but I
may still need an additional month or two.'' [R. 65 l.] Mr. Robinson reasoned that "most
analysts think that rates will drop in December and, again, in January," [R. 652.] Ms.
Bean responded back, "my concern is that rates might just as well go up and then you
would also be in a mess and want to totally redo the deal." [R. 654.]
It appears that Mr. Robinson relies on a March 17, 2008, email from Ms. Bean to
Mr. Robinson for his proposition that Jones Waldo advised him that he did not need to
file a loan application. The email, in relevant pati, states:

I'm pulling the most cmTent Utah cases on impossibility and first to breach
so we can refocus our prior pleading to now state-now Debra [Ms. Robinson] has performed, but it is too late and her tardiness makes the agreement
impossible to effect and because she was the first to breach (on the plaza,
deer valley, etc), you don't have to perform.
[R. 674.]
The text and context of this email demonstrate that Ms. Bean was explaining her
desperate attempt to formulate an argument for the divorce comt justifying Mr. Robinson: s non-perfonnance of his refinance obligation. At the time of this email, Mr. Robin-

son and Jones \Valdo were facing Ms. Robinson's motion to enforce the Stipulation and
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enter a decree of divorce. [R. 357-58.] Ms. Bean was explaining to Mr. Robinson the

arguments she planned to make to the divorce court in an effort to have the Settlement
Agreement set aside. She was not "advising" and never did advise Mr. Robinson that he
need not file an application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza. To the contrary, Ms. Bean
lamented in the second paragraph of her March 17, 2008, email that it would have been
"far more effective to have documentation to support our argument re: impossibility
which is why further support from the lender would be very helpful.'' [R. 674.]

2.

Even if Ms. Bean advised him not to
refinance, Mr. Robinson still fails to prove
that this advice caused his alleged damages.

Even assuming that Mr. Robinson is correct in his assertion that Ms. Bean told

him not to attempt to refinance the Phoenix Plaza, Mr. Robinson's argument still fails because Mr. Robinson has never presented an iota of evidence that he would somehow be
better off today if Ms. Bean had not given this hypothetical advice. Rather, Mr. Robinson asks the court to speculate about what would have then occurred and what the ultimate outcome might have been, especially given the real estate crash of late 2007 and
early 2008. As the divorce court aptly stated, "[n]one of us will ever know given that,
whether he had done so [applied to refinance the Phoenix Plaza], the refinance would or
would not have occurred." [R. 369]; see also Harline, 912 P.2d at 439 ("[P]roximate
cause issues can be decided as a matter of law ... when the proximate cause of an injury
is left to speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of law.").
Mr. Robinson further argues that Jones Waldo should have negotiated a better Settlement Agreement for him, and that if Ms. Robinson would not have agreed to a better
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Settlement Agreement for 1V1r. Robinson, "then there would have been no agreement~ and

the divorce action would have gone to the divorce comi for an equitable distribution of
the parties' assets." [App. Bf. 26-27.] Mr. Robinson argues that he \;\.rould have gotten a
better deal from the divorce court. All of this is pure~ unadulterated speculation ,vith no
evidentiary foundation.
The record establishes that Ms. Robinson would not have agreed to more favorable terms for Mr. Robinson in the Settlement Agreement. [R. 315-17, 420-28]. And Mr.
Robinson has utterly failed to offer any evidence that he would have been better off if the
case had not settled at mediation. Indeed, l\,1r. Robinson has made no attempt-neither at
the trial level, nor in the Rule 56(±) motion papers, nor on appeal-to approach this issue.
Mr. Robinson's appeal ultimately suffers the same defects that existed in the trial
court. He did not, has not, and cannot establish a causal link between the alleged wrongdoing and his alleged damages. The trial comi properly awarded summary judgment on
this basis. See Harline, 912 P.2d at 439; see also Christensen & Jensen, P.C v. Barrett
& Daines, 2008 UT 64,

~~

25-32, 194 P.3d 931 (affinning trial comi's grant of summary

judgment because plaintiffs failed to establish causation); Breton v. Clyde Sn0v1,. & Ses-

sions, 2013 UT App 65,

~,r 10-16, 299 P.3d

13 (affinning trial comi's grant of sununary

judgment because plaintiff caused his own harm).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affinn the trial court's denial of Jvfr.
Robinson's Rule 56(£) motion, and the grant of Jones Vvaldo'.s summary judgment motion.
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